Perceiving that government must be able to react "flexibly and rapidly to stabilize the economy and to protect the disadvantaged from fluctuations in the unmanaged market,"44 the Roosevelt Administration considered a presidentially managed "system of more unified powers"45 to be an essential part of its social reform agenda. For this system to work, the President must be in charge of the instruments of administration, including, of course, the power to hire and fire agency heads. The resulting conflicts, needless to say, did not help New Deal reform efforts. Turf wars between the Justice Department and New Deal agencies over the conduct and control of litigation proved time-consuming and emotionally draining.'21 More significantly, after wrestling control of litigation from a resisting agency, the Department sometimes proved ill-equipped to advance vigorously agency interests.'22 Finally, at times, efforts at coordination between Department and agency attorneys backfired.'23 As a result, while an internal Department memorandum emphasized that "care must be taken to avoid the impression that we are seeking to curb or limit the authority of a particular agency,"'124 the Department concluded that the best way to avoid "mishaps" was to be unrelenting in its quest to establish itself as chief litigator for the United [Vol. 96:237
States.'25 During this period of transition,126 New Deal programmatic objectives sometimes gave way to New Deal efforts to strengthen the administrative presidency through the centralization of litigation authority.
The Roosevelt White House did not intervene in these intra-executive disputes.127 Believing that judicial appointments, not legal arguments, were the key to transforming the Court, Roosevelt apparently concluded these turf wars were inconsequential. Yet, even if the White House thought that legal advocacy mattered, FDR's interest in strengthening the administrative presidency may well have justified the shift in litigation authority. In particular, by centralizing legal policymaking in the Justice Department, the government can speak with a single voice in court. Equally significant, the President or his cabinet level surrogate, the Attorney General, is in charge of that voice. Under a decentralized scheme, in contrast, government agencies-subject to competing external pressures from oversight committees and constituency interests-will sometimes square off with each other in court.128 Decentralization, moreover, encourages agencies to advance conflicting approaches to jurisdiction, statutory interpretation, and other issues that cut across all government litigation. To prevent New Deal agencies from discounting the consequences of their legal arguments for other parts of the government, it makes sense that Roosevelt would have wanted the Department of Justice to coordinate government litigation. 129 This approach towards centralized, coordinated legal policymaking matched Roosevelt's views on reorganization. According to Richard Polenberg, Roosevelt felt that the primary purpose of reorganization was not to reduce expenditures, but to strengthen the administrative presidency through "improved management, which would make administration more responsive to the national interest and better able to serve that interest." ' Leuchtenburg should not be faulted too much for failing to consider these matters. He does not intend that his history speak to these issues. More than anything, his is the story of why the Roosevelt Administration pursued its Courtpacking plan, why the plan was defeated, and the consequences of its defeat. Consequently, just as the Roosevelt Administration did not seriously contemplate the possibility that its Constitutional Revolution could be launched without a "frontal attack" on the courts, Leuchtenburg, too, pays little attention to this issue. Correlatively, it is not surprising that Leuchtenburg does not address FDR's reorganization of the Justice Department, for the Roosevelt Administration never seriously considered the possible impact of this reorganization on its litigation agenda. The Supreme Court Reborn, then, is neither monumental nor definitive. It is, however, essential reading on the Roosevelt Revolution. Literate and well-crafted, Leuchtenburg's work is a compelling account of the
